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THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN VIRGINIA
W. H. MORELAND*
It is here intended first to present a pattern of the Parol Evidence
Rule in what is believed to be its generally accepted form and then
to attempt to fit Virginia cases into that pattern. The work of our
great American scholars, Wigmorel and Williston,2 will be accepted
as the true exponent of that pattern.
That view of the subject will be accepted which assigns to the
Parol Evidence Rule only a portion of the large problem of how to
give legal effect to written documents; 3 and that portion is the zdentz-
fication of the legal act as distinguished from the interpretation of the
legal act after its identity has been fixed upon. Therefore, the dis-
cussion will not include rules for interpreting legal documents. Be-
fore the time comes for interpretation there must be a legal act to be
interpreted. It is equally true, however, that the two processes do not
necessarily take place successively; to a great extent they rather sup-
plement and accompany one another. We cannot determine how far
we may add to a legal act at least partially integrated, 4 unless we can
at the same time interpret the writing so far as we have it. This has
led some writers to say that there is only one rule.5 We prefer the
view that there are two distinct processes-one the identification of
the legal act in its entirety, and the other the legal interpretation of
that legal act. It is with the first process that we shall be concerned.
*Dean and Bradford Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School
of Law.
'The reference is to Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 194o). Hereafter it will be
referred to simply as Wigmore.
sThe reference is to Williston on Contracts (rev. ed. 1936). Hereafter it will be
referred to simply as Williston. Reference to "Greenleaf" will be to i Greenleaf on
Evidence (16th ed., Vigmore).
sWilliston discusses both the Parol Evidence Rule and the rules for interpret-
ing documents in one chapter, "The Scope and Meaning of Contracts," Williston,
C. 22.
'The integration of the act consists in embodying it in a single memorial as a
writing. Williston § 632.
5Williston § 632; Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule (1929) 14
Minn. L. Rev. 2o, 35.
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SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
The best known definition of the Parol Evidence Rule is that of
Greenleaf: "Parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to con-
tradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument." 6 A concise
statement of the rule, not so well known is: "A written contract is
what the written instrument says it is; nothing more, nothing less,
and nothing different." 7 An early Virginia case gives us the following:
It is a "general rule equally applicable to courts of Law and Equity
that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or substantially vary
the legal import of a written agreement." 8
1. The rule is not a rule of evidence at all, but a rule of substantive
law.9 Following Thayer's great exposition of the subject, this principle
is now generally accepted. 10
This brings up an interesting question. If evidence, improper un-
der the Parol Evidence Rule, is admitted without objection, should
the jury be permitted to consider it, or should the court trying the
case without a jury consider it, or should the case be handled as one
in which improper evidence having probative value is admitted with-
out objection?
Clearly, if evidence which is excluded by a rule of exclusion, such
as the hearsay rule, has been admitted without objection it will be
considered." This does not fit in with the theory that the Parol Evi-
dence Rule is a rule of substantive law, and that such objectionable
evidence does not establish a term of the contract because under the
law it is not a part of the contract. The courts are divided, some
holding that being admitted without objection it should be treated
as part of the evidence in the case,1 2 with other courts following the
logical view that as a matter of substantive law, though the term is
proved, it cannot be treated as a part of the contract; and therefore,
it should not be taken into consideration. However, a qualification
is added in the interest of dealing fairly with the trial court: objec-
OGreenleaf 405.
'Salmond and Winfield, Law of Contracts (1927) 104.
'Ratcliffe v. Allison, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 537 (z825).-
*Williston § 631; Wigmore § 240o; Restatement of Contracts (1932) § 233,
Comment.
'wThayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898) c. 1o, p. 39o; American Crys-
tal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F. (2d) 477, 479 (C. C. A. ioth, 1941.
"Stevens v. Mirakian, 177 Va. 123, 12 S. E. (2d) 780 (1941); Note (1936) 1o4 A. L.
R. ii3o.2 Brady v. Nally, 151 N. Y. 258, 45 N. E. 547 (1896).
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tion to consideration of the intruder must be made in the lower
court and cannot be made for the first time in the appellate court.
The case cannot be tried on one theory in lower court and on an-
other theory in appellate court.13 This would be something like
permitting a trial court to proceed without taking judicial notice
and then urging an appellate court to take judicial notice.'
4
2. That which appears to be a jural act may not be enforceable
as such:
(a) Because the party in a unilateral act or the parties in a bilater-
al act did not intend that jural relations should be created.15
(b) Because the act was not intended by the parties to be final,
though it was the act they had agreed on. Its ultimate taking effect
depended upon the happening of an extrinsic event.16
(c) Because, while a jural act may have been created, it was not
the jural act given expression in the writing.
17
(d) Because, though the parties intended this jural act, it is not
enforceable as such because of defenses which may be made to it in
law or in equity.'8
The cases under (a) are few when the act is unilateral. But one
of the best cases was decided in Virginia in 1921, when on the offer
of a will for probate, the opponents of the probate were permitted
to offer evidence to prove that while the document was executed
with all proper legal formalities, the signer did not intend that the
writing should be his will.19 This may be considered as arising under
the statute with reference to wills, but the principle i! the same. But
where the act is bilateral different principles apply, and a number
of Virginia cases illustrate the point. The case which frequently arises
is this: A bank is in financial distress. To swell its assets a director
deposits his note for which he receives no consideration; later when
sued on the note, he attempts to set up that defense. This is a danger-
ous procedure for, on one reason or another, he is forced to pay,
12Higgs v. de Maziroff, 263 N. Y. 4'73, 189 N. E. 555 (1934); Note (1934) 92 A. L.
R. 8io; 2o Am. Jur., Evidence § 11oi.
1 Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irr. Co., 265 Fed. 594 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920).
'nWigmore § 24o6.
"Williston § 634; Wigmore §§ 2408, 2409, 2410.
1
%Vigmore § 2413-2417.
"Williston § 634; Wigmore §§ 2423, 2439.
uClark v. Hugo, ixo Va. 99, 107 S. E. 730 (1921).
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the courts differing widely in the reasons they give for holding him
responsible.
20
In the cases which have arisen in Virginia on this point, the in-
strument given was usually a bond, in which case the problem of
consideration does not arise; but cases are not wanting in which
defenses were offered to liability. In a very recent case the defense
attempted was that defendant was induced to execute the bond by
the cashier's assurance that the bank was solvent. The court repelled
this attempt with the striking and surprising statement that as de-
fendant could not show a parol promise which would modify his
engagement to pay, then he cannot show this misrepresentation or
fraud which would have the result of relieving him from his obliga-
tion to pay.21 This is rather difficult to understand, particularly in
view of the universal rule that fraud may be set up despite the Parol
Evidence Rule, and in view of the court's recent holding that in-
nocent misrepresentation will support an action for damages.22 In
another case directors, when sued on their bond to protect the bank,
attempted to prove that their liability was to cease when a particular
debt of $35,000 should be repaid to the bank. This, of course, was a
very clear attempt to qualify their absolute promise in the writing,
and the defense was very properly excluded.23 In the last reported
case decided by the court, a director, sued on his note, attempted
without success to prove a parol agreement that the note was to be
paid by having credited on it collections on certain notes and se-
curities held by the bank.24 Clearly, this would have altered the ab-
solute promise to pay. All in all, the person who comes to the aid of
a failing bank experiences difficulty in avoiding liability on his un-
dertaking. But, digressing still further, it may be pointed out that by
rearranging some of the terms of the entire arrangement between thE
bank and the director, the desired result might have been attained,
If there had been an agreement either in writing or orally entered
"(1924) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 239; (1916) 64 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 404; (1927) 75 U. 0
Pa. L. Rev. 261; Bay Parkway Nat'l. Bank of Brooklyn v. Shalom, 27o N. Y. 172, 20(
N. E. 685 (1936); Mount Vernon Trust Co. v. Bergoff, 272 N. Y. 192, 5 N. E. (2d) ig9
(1936).
"Nottingham v. Farmers Bank, 170 Va. 291, 196 S. E. 634 (1938).
"Union Trust Corp. v. Fugate, 172 Va. 82, 200 S. E. 624 (1939); Note (1939)
Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 98.
"White v. Com., 158 Va. 749, 164 S. E. 375 (1932).
2'Godwin v. Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 17 S. E. (2d) 410 (1941).
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into as part of the transaction which gave raise to the note that cer-
tain of the bank's accounts should be set aside and the collections
thereon credited to the director, the credits arising from such col-
lections could have been availed of as a set-off against the note.25
Another case presented a very unusual situation. P conveyed land
to D who executed notes therefor in the amount of $8,75o and con-
veyed the property in trust to secure them. Later the property was
sold under the deed of trust. After crediting the amount produced
by the sale on the notes more than $6,ooo was left due, and P sued
D at law to recover this amount. The defense was that the entire
transaction was a sham. But unfortunately for D, he had told third
persons that he had bought the property and had said that the notes
were good. The court held that the defense could not be made.
26
If this simply amounts to holding that his defense was false, of
course there is nothing unusual about the court's holding that the
defense could not succeed. But it does not follow that because he
might be estopped as to persons who had relied on his statements
and had dealt with the notes as valid, he could not show the real na-
ture of the transaction as between himself and his grantor. All that
the court had to say about violating the Parol Evidence Rule and
proof of conditional delivery of the notes seems beside the point.
Under (b) we have the familiar case in which by understanding
of the parties, not expressed in the writing, the taking effect of the
jural act, complete on its face, is to wait some extrinsic event. The
leading case is probably Pym v. Campbell.27 "By the present prin-
ciple, the act is not an act until the final moment appointed, and
that moment may by the the parties be made to depend upon some
future event, which thus becomes a condition precedent to the jural
existence of the act."28
"In the United States, the doctrine is not only completely accepted,
but has even been applied to sealed instruments other than deeds of
land in jurisdictions still bound by precedent to the older rule for
deeds."2
9
2'Rector v. Hancock, 127 Va. i1, 1o2 S. E. 663 (1920); Wigmore § 2444.
"Clark v. Miller, 148 Va. 83, 138 S. E. 556 (1927).
"7 6 E. & B. 370 (1856); briefly stated, Wigmore § 241o, n. 2.
"Wigmore § 2410, p. 35; Williston § 634.
"Wigmore § 2410, p. 30; Williston § 6 34.
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Several distinctions must be made:
(I) The so-called condition may be actually written in the con-
tract, when, of course, the problem is one of construction or inter-
pretation.3 0
(2) It is possible to consider the proof of such a term or condi-
tion as an exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. There is excellent
authority for this view.31 But under the view first spoken of, the
matter is entirely outside of the Parol Evidence Rule, and this is
the view generally taken.
(3) Distinction must be made between the present problem and
that presented when the term or provision in question is to accompany
and affect the performance of the contract or bring it to a conclusion.
Either presents a true problem under the Parol Evidence Rule, for if
evidence to prove the provision is admitted it really amounts to sup-
plementing and varying the contract.3 2
This state is firmly committed to the view that to prove such a con-
dition does not violate the Parol Evidence Rule.38 A note may be de-
livered on such a condition which can be proved to show that the in-
strument never went into effect.3 4 And the same rule prevails as to an
endorsement.3 5 Of course, the intervention of a holder in due course
changes the picture.36 An insurance policy may be delivered subject to
such a condition.3 7 The outstanding case is Whitaker v. Lane, decided
in 1920.38 Here the court restated the principle and in addition ap-
$*Willison § 634.
nBallantine, Delivery in Escrow and the Parol Evidence Rule (1920) 29 Yale L.
Jour. 826; Corbin, Delivery of Written Contracts (1927) 36 Yale L. Jour. 443, 455;
Salmond and Winfield, Law of Contracts (1927) l18.
nWigmore § 2410, p. 35; Williston § 634. Crafts v. Broadway Bank, 142 Va. 702,
128 S. E. 564 (1925).
33Rhodes v. Walton, 163 Va. 36o, 175 S. E. 865 (1934). The Court also said, if
the bond was not delivered on condition, to prove the subject matter of the alleged
condition would violate the Parol Evidence Rule, while if the bond was delivered
on condition, the condition had transpired and the bond was effective according to
its terms..
uCatt v. Olivier, 98 Va. 58o, 36 S. E. 98o (19oo).
5Hawse v. First Natl. Bank, 113 Va. 588, 75 S. E. 127 (1912); Robertson v. Va.
Natl. Bank, 135 Va. 166, 115 S. E. 536 (1923).
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) §§ 5578, 5614; Cox v. Parsons, 165 Va. 575, 183
S. E. 44o (1936); Wheeler v. Wardell, 173 Va. 168, 3 S. E. (2d) 377 (1939).
'Reliance Ins. Co. v. Gulley, 134 Va. 468, 114 S. E. 551 (1922).
'128 Va. 317, 4 S. E. 252, i A. L. R. 1157 (1920); and the principle applies
though the instrument is a deed conveying land and has been recorded, Burnett v.
Rhudy, 137 Va. 67, 119 S. E. 97 (1923)- Meadows v. McClaugherty, 167 Va. 41, 187
S. E. 475 (x936)-
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plied it to a situation to which the cases from the earliest times have
said it had no application-stated otherwise, a sealed instrument
complete on its face could not be delivered to the obligee on con-
dition; the condition could not be shown. The case, which is prob-
ably the most definite instance of judicial legislation in our law, has
been very frequently cited and strictly adhered to, though there
have been numerous occasions when attempts have been made to ex-
tend its application to cases to which it had no application: to a case
in which the condition was written in the contract when only a ques-
tion of interpretation was presented;3 9 to a case in which it was at-
tempted to prove that the instrument could be discharged by payment
of a smaller amount.4 0 When an action was brought on a note given
for an automobile, the defendant was not permitted to show that the
note was not to be paid unless the buyer sold the automobile for a price
equal to the amount of the note. The court said that this was condi-
tion subsequent. 1 Our court has carefully preserved the distinction
between varying the contract and setting up a condition which pre-
vents the contract from taking effect.4 2 And it is well that this is true,
for otherwise there would be scant protection from the "uncertain
testimony of slippery memory."
Under (c), we have the familiar case of error in expression which
calls for equitable relief by way of reformation. This is not generally
looked upon as part of the Parol Evidence Rule at all. It is certainly
true that normal equitable relief is never obstructed by the rule. It is
not nesessary to cite Virginia cases on reformation of contract. It must
be remembered, however, that there must be some basis for equitable
relief. When parties deliberately leave a provision out of their contract,
there is no such basis and there is no relief.43 While beyond the scope
of this discussion, the application of the Statute of Frauds44 may pre-
sent interesting and difficult questions. For example, defendant may
offer to prove that the memorandum does not state the actual agree-
ment. May he do this and thus render the contract unenforceable? May
OHopkins v. Le Cato, x42 Va. 769, 128 S. E. 55 (1925), with two judges dissenting.
"'White v. Com., 158 Va. 749, 164 S. E. 375 (1932).
"Continental Trust Co. v. Witt, 139 Va. 458, 124 S. E. 265 (1924).
"Crafts v. Broadway Bank, 142 Va. 702, 128 S. E. 364 (1925); Rhodes v. Walton,
x63 Va. 36o, 175 S. E. 865 (1934).
"Broughton v. Coffer, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 184 (1868); Shenandoah Valley R. Co.
v. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346, 1o S. E. 239 (1889); Charles v. McClanahan, 130 Va. 682, 1o8
S. E. 858 (1921).
"Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5561.
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plaintiff in such a case have the memorandum reformed to express the
true agreement?
45
Under (d), some of the defenses, infancy, illegality, fraud, forgery,
duress and insanity, are purely legal and have no connection with the
Parol Evidence Rule, though of course they may furnish a basis for
equitable relief.46 Others, so-called equitable, open up the whole field
of mistake and its effect on the written act-a very difficult and import-
ant subject, but here again the Parol Evidence Rule plays no part in
handling such problems, and it is not necessary or proper to go into
the Virginia case law.47 The Parol Evidence Rule applies in equity as
well as in law, and one who sues for specific performance of a con-
tract is bound by the rule if he attempts to add to or vary the terms
to the contract which he wishes enforced.48 The rule does not pre-
vent proof of the well recognized defenses to specific performance
such as misrepresentation, unfairness, hardship and other circum-
stances outside of the writing which make it inequitable to grant
specific performance.4 9 Probably no better case can be found than a
Virginia case decided in 1825,50 when in an action to enforce specific
performance of a written contract to sell a town lot the defense was
made that while the vendee had orally agreed that he would not
set up a tavern on the lot, he had refused to sign a contract which
contained that restriction. In an excellent opinion, Carr, J., made
it clear that while to .incorporate the term in the contract would
violate the Parol Evidence Rule, to prove it to defeat specific per-
formance was permissible. The learned judge did not fall into the
mistake (as many modern judges do) of treating such defenses as ex-
ceptions to the rule.
On the other extreme is a New York case in which rescission of
a deed was granted because the conveyance had been secured under
the false oral promise that the lot was not to be used for business
"Donald Friedman & Co., Inc. c. Newman, 255 N. Y. 340, 174 N. E. 7o3, 73 A. L.
R. 99 (1931); McClintock on Equity (1936) 177; Note (1931) 16 Corn. L. Q. 39o; Note
(1931) 4o Yale L. Jour. 795; Note (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 866; Note (1931) 26 Ill. L.
Rev. 320; 5 Williston § 1552, n. 2.
"Wigmore §§ 2423, 2439. See elaborate opinion of Epes, J., in Richeson v. Wood,
158 Va. 269, 163 S. E. 339 (1932). Williston § 634.
'TWigmore §§ 2413-2421.
"See Slaughter v. Smither, 97 Va. 202, 23 S. E. 544 (1899). Mitchill v. Lath, 247
N. Y. 377, i6o N. E. 646 (1928); Williston § 631.
"Williston § 631.
ORatcliffe v. Allison, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 537 (18 25). Specific performance was
granted, however, because the vendee had been in possession of the lot for many
years and had showed no disposition to set up a tavern.
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purposes.5 1 Here no doubt the Parol Evidence Rule would have pre-
vented an action for damages for breach of contract or covenant, but
the inadmissible oral promise furnished the basis for affirmative equit-
able relief.
We are at last brought face to face with the Parol Evidence Rule,
and the question is: Does the writing constitute integration of a legal
or jural act; and if integration, is it partial or complete? If there has
been no integration, there is no place for application of the rule; if
integration is partial or complete, the rule must be considered.
It is clear that not every exchange of writings between parties
amounts to integration; receipts, bills of lading, memoranda of various
sorts, entries in a party's books, may refer to jural relations but may
not have been intended by the parties to be memorials of their under-
takings. They may be mere evidence.52 Thus, in a Virginia case when
an attorney signed a receipt for bonds that were placed in his hands
for collection, it might be proved that the bonds should be held by
him as collateral security for certain claims in the attorney's hands.
5 3
But merely to call a document a receipt does not necessarily bring
about this result. It may actually be a contract.
54
The questions as a lawyer would put them are these: Does the Parol
Evidence Rule apply to this writing; and if it does, is this additional ma-
terial excluded, or may I add it to the writing, or may I contradict some-
thing in the writing?
This is the problem to which our discussion will be principally
directed: assuming that we have an integrated jural act, say a contract,
is the integration partial, in which case further terms may be added,
or is it complete, in which case the Parol Evidence Rule applies to
the full extent, excluding everything outside of the writing?
This question begging statement is not at all helpful. How may
we determine whether integration is partial or complete? We must
consider the cases. Before taking up the Virginia cases we may state
two of the outside cases. Let us consider first, Thompson v. Libby, 5
one of the leading cases in which the opinion was delivered by one
of the best of American judges. This was an action to recover the
5Adams v. Gillig, i99 N. Y. 314, 92 N. E. 670, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 127, 2o Ann.
Cas. 91o (igo).
uigmore § 2432.
Tuley v. Barton, 79 Va. 387 (1884).
5 Wigmore § 2432.
uThompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 26 N. W. 1 (1885).
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purchase price of logs delivered pursuant to a written contract which
was in the following terms: "Hastings, Minnesota
June 1, 1883
I have this day sold to R. C. Libby, of Hastings, Minn.,
all my logs marked H. C. A., cut in the winters of 1882 and
1883 for ten dollars a thousand feet, boom scale at Minne-
apolis, Minnesota. Payment cash as fast as scale bills are pro-
duced. J. H. THOMPSON
By D. S. MOOERS
R. C. LIBBY"
The defense pleaded was oral warranty of the quality of the logs al-
leged to have been made at the time of the sale, and a breach of that
warranty. The question was, would the proof of the oral warranty vio-
late the Parol Evidence Rule? Going into some detail, the problem
was handled as follows: The court quoted Greenleaf's rule,56 and
pointed out that the rule presupposes that the parties intended to
have the terms of their complete agreement embraced in the writing.
But in what manner shall it be determined whether the parties in-
tended to express the whole of their agreement in writing? It is some-
times loosely said that where the whole contract be not reduced to
writing, evidence may be admitted to prove the part omitted. But the
court quickly pointed out that to permit a party to lay the founda-
tion by oral testimony that only part of the agreement was reduced to
writing and then prove the part omitted, would be to work in a circle
and permit the very evil that the rule was designed to prevent. The
only criterion of the completeness of the written contract as a full
expression of the agreement of the parties is the writing itself. This
agreement purports to be a full expression of the whole agreement.
It follows necessarily that the alleged oral warranty could not be
proved.
But with the passing of the years the learned judge had occasion to
elaborate and modify his views on this subject, and in a later case 57 the
subject is treated as follows: there are two extreme views, some cases
holding that the incompleteness of the written contract may be shown
by going outside of the writing and showing an omitted term; but
this leaves very little of he rule remaining. Other cases go to the op-
posite extreme by holding that the incompleteness of the writing must
"Greenleaf 405.
5TWheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mfg. Co., 66 Minn. 156, i6o, 68 N. W.
854 (1896).
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appear from the face of the document from mere inspection. But, con-
cluded this distinguished judge, the true rule is that the only criterion
of the completeness of the written contract as a full expression of the
agreement of the parties is the writing itself; and, in determining
whether it is thus complete, it is to be construed according to its sub-
ject matter and the circumstances under which, and the purposes for
which, it was executed.
It is suggested that this view is unquestionably sound and is fol-
lowed by practically all courts today, though many continue to assert
that the incompleteness of the contract must appear from an inspection
of the writing itself. Fortunately, this latter rule is not actually applied
in deciding the cases. Mr. Wigmore says5s of looking exclusively at
the writing, "Such a proposition, however, is untenable, both on prin-
ciple and in practice. In practice, it is not enforced by its theoretical
advocates"
It must be apparent, however, that the result of Judge Mitchell's
efforts, while clearly designating the data which may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the parties intended all
of their agreement to be expressed in the writing, gives us no rule by
which we can evaluate the data and reach the critical conclusion-
what was the parties' intention? For this we must look elsewhere.
In another case the plaintiff sued on a written contract which pro-
vided that plaintiff should cut and deliver certain poplar logs to de-
fendant, The contract was much more elaborate than that in Thomp-
son v. Libby,. just considered, but failed to contain any agreement as
to how and by whom the logs were to be measured. Could evidence
be received to prove an oral agreement which the parties had entered
into on that subject but which had not been included in the written
contract? The court permitted it to be proved, saying that the writings
were only informal memoranda exchanged relating to time, place, and
price and making certain the things usually most in debate and most
desirable to have made certain. The logs would require to be scaled; it
was natural to provide for a scaler, and the omission to name him in
the contract does-not indicate that the parties agreed to do without a
scaler. The alleged oral agreement does not add to, substract from, or
in any way vary the duties of either party. Therefore, the oral stipula-
tion could be proved.50
8Vigmore § 2431, p. ioS.
IOGould v. Boston Excelsior Co., 91 Maine 214, 39 At. 554, 64 Am. St. Rep.
2 (x898). Compare Marsteller v. Warden, 115 Va. 353, 79 S. E. 332 (1913).
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Several remarks may be ventured principally to emphasize the ques-
tions involved and the court's method of solving them. The contract
while somewhat informal was really rather complete, dealing with all
terms which might normally be expected to be found in such an agree-
ment-except that no method of scaling or measuring the logs was
provided for. The court noted that the logs would require to be scaled
in order that the amount due for plaintiff's service could be estimated,
and therefore it would be natural to provide for a scaler. The court
thus went entirely beyond the contract in its inquiry, but it certainly
was mistaken when it said that to prove the oral term would not vary
the contract. If that were not the effect of the oral term, why should
either party wish to prove it? In fact, the court failed to demonstraie
any principle by which a court, estimating the data before it, decides
whether the parties intended the writing to be the sole memorial of
the terms of their agreement, though it adopts a perfectly sound course
in taking into consideration the matters which parties situated as these
were would have to consider or might consider. As it was necessary that
there be some understanding on the subject of measuring, the contract
to that extent at least was only partial integration of their agreement.
The importance of the case lies in the fact that the court looked be-
yond the contract itself and took into consideration the circumstance
that parties situated as these were would naturally and normally have
to take into consideration.
It is apparent that our great need is for a rule by which to de-
termine whether the integration is partial or complete; and this is not
changed by the fact that some of the cases are so plain that the result
stands out, clear and unquestionable. Referring again to the excellent
opinion in Thompson v. Libby, as supplemented in a later opinion by
the same eminent judge, some courts say that the incompleteness of
the contract must appear from an inspection of the writing. This
does not explain the cases; and no matter how often such a rule may be
repeated by the courts, it is not applied in the cases, for if it were, no
parol evidence could ever be offered when the contract on inspection
appears to be complete. The statement is frequently found even in ac-
tions brought on negotiable paper. Another statement which goes to
the opposite extreme is to the effect that if the contract is silent on the
subject of the proposed term, the contract may be supplemented. It
is at once apparent that this abrogates the Parol Evidence Rule entire-
ly when an attempt is made to add to a contract on a subject on which
it is silent. This is clear because we certainly would not add a term on
which there had been no agreement, but if the jury found that there
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was such an agreement the term would be added. This, of course, obvi-
ates all need for a rule, for no term would be added on which there had
been no agreement. 60 Fortunately, the courts for the most part pay
only lip service to such a rule. Actually, the silence of the contract on
a particular subject is merely of evidential value in determining
whether the parties intended the writing to be the sole memorial of
their undertakings.
Another statement frequently found in cases is that a collateral
term may be added. But clearly this does not give us a rule of decision,
for the term entirely lacks content. Whether one thing is collateral to
another is largely a matter of degree or viewpoint, for as Williston
says: "where an agreement contains several promises on each side, it
is ordinarily easy to put any of them in the form of a collateral agree-
ment."61
Frequently the statement is found that the true consideration may
be shown. This, however, is mere borrowing from the law with re-
spect to deeds, where the consideration unless executory may be
shown. But consider the usual executory contract-promise for pro-
mise, each promise being consideration for the other. Certainly
whether the contract can be varied cannot depend on the position of
the parties in the action. The plaintiff's undertakings constitute con-
sideration, while the defendant's undertakings are promises. Plain-
tiff's side of the controversy may be varied, but defendant's may not.
Of course there is no such rule, and no such result would be counten-
anced. But remarkable as it may seem, the statement is frequently
made that consideration can be varied. The results reached in the
cases are usually sound and are easily explained on other grounds.
"In general, then, it may be said that a recital of consideration re-
ceived is, like other admissions, disputable so far as concerns the thing
actually received; but that, so far as the terms of the contractual act
are involved, the writing must control, whether it uses the term 'con-
sideration,' or not, and therefore the terms are not disputable."6 2
But our quest is for a rule to guide us in determining whether the
writing may be varied or added to. Without such a rule one wanders
through the maze of decided cases and, aside from the cases in which
there was a plain attempt to contradict what was already written, he
*Williston § 633; Eighxnie v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 288, 294 (1885).
eWVilliston §§ 638, 639, 640; igmore § 2430.
"Wigmore § 2433; Wood v. Southern Brick Corp., 173 Va. 364, 4 S. E. (2d)
36o (1939); Burke v. Sweeley, 177 Va. 47, 12 S. E. (2d) 763 (1941).
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must get the feeling that the decision in each was made on an intuition
or hunch and that what is stated as the rule governing the decision is
no more than an attempted rationalization which, not infrequently,
expresses what is actually belied in the decision the court is in the
act of making. Of course, this is not to say the wrong decision was
reached.
It is generally agreed that the question, is the writing complete or
partial integration, depends on the intention of the parties.63It is
evident that whether the parties intended complete integration can-
not be determined by direct proof as to this intent, for if this were
opened up to direct proof there would be nothing left of the Parol
Evidence Rule. One party would offer evidence, including his own
testimony, as to what this intent was and the other party would do
likewise. "Slippery memory" would do its fell work-and this is what
the rule is devised to prevent. Consequently, it is now generally ac-
cepted that the proof of intent must be by indirection. 4
Of course, this intent may be specifically expressed in the writing;
but unless the parties do this, "the very fact that the parties made a
contemporaneous oral agreement will of itself prove that they did
not intend the writing to be a complete memorial. The only question
open would be whether such a contemporaneous oral agreement was
in fact made.... Certainly the law does not permit this."65
Then how can this all-controlling intent be arrived at? Two pro-
cesses are necessary: It is now generally agreed that the contract
must be read in the light of the purpose the parties were intending
to effect by their negotiations-were they negotiating a loan of money,
the sale of an automobile, of an apartment house, or of a manufactur-
ing plant? If the subject of negotiation was a loan of money, we
should be apt to assume that the note given was the sole memorial of
their engagements; if they were selling an automobile, a promissory
note would certainly not be considered the sole memorial.
But the court, by putting itself in the position occupied by the
negotiating parties, does not thereby decide the question of whether
the offered evidence is admissible? Our search is for a rule which will
enable us to use the data which has been assembled.
* After citing a multitude of cases, Wigmore takes this gloomy view
of the situation:
uWigmore § 2430, p. 98; Williston § 633.
""This intent, of course, must be judged by an external standard," Wig-
more, § 243o, n. 1.
OWilliston § 633.
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"Even in the foregoing classes of transactions, it is rare that
the circumstances of a particular case cannot justify a special
result contrary to the ordinary one. Such is the complexity
of circumstance and the variety of documentary phraseology,
and so minute the indicia of intent, that one ruling can seldom
be of controlling authority or even of utility for a subsequent
one. The opinions of judges are cumbered with citations of cases
which serve no purpose there except to prove what is not dis-
puted,-the general principle."66
And he concludes with the suggestion that in almost all instances
the application of the rule should be left to the judge's determination.
Another authority speaks of the general run of opinions as "a rehash
of contradictory cliches, worn smooth with unthinking repetition
since they were first culled from the pages of Greenleaf." 67
But dark as the picture is, it is believed that in recent years there
has been at least a very considerable approach to a rule which will
reconcile most of the cases.
Turning first to Wigmore, his suggestion is:
"the chief and most satisfactory index for the judge is found
in the circumstance whether or not the particular element of
the extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in the writing.
If it is mentioned, covered, or dealt with in the writing, then
presumably the writing was meant to represent all of the trans-
action on that element; if it is not, then probably the writing
was not intended to embody that element of the negotiation."
This principle, he says, is used by most careful judges.68 The judge
decides whether or not evidence to prove the questioned term may
be admitted. If it is admitted, the jury decides whether the parties
agreed on the omitted term.
With all proper deference the suggestion is offered that the above
is of only limited assistance. If a written contract for the sale of chat-
tels contains no warranty at all, may an oral waranty be included; or
if the contract contains two warranties, may another be added? Wil-
liston's approach is this:
"the test of admissibility is much affected by the inherent prob-
ability of parties who contract under the circumstances in ques-
tion, simultaneously making both the agreement in writing
which is before the court, and also the alleged parol agreement.
06Wigmore § 2442; see also Greenleaf § 3o5f.
67AcCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule (1932) 41 Yale L. Jour. 365, 383.
69Vigmore § 2430, pp. 98, 99; compare Williston § 639, p. 1837.
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The point is not merely whether the court is convinced that
the parties before it did in fact do this, but whether parties so
situated generally would or might do so. If that is true, the
parol agreement is so far collateral and separate from the writ-
ing as to make it admissible." 69
This view, the writer submits, has been taken up by the courts
and has found expression in an increasing number of states as the
true governing rule by which to determine the parties' intention.
The first case to apply this rule definitely and clearly was decided
in Pennsylvania in 1924. A store in an office building was rented to
be used only for the sale of "fruit, candy, soda-water," and the sale
of tobacco in any form was prohibited. Tenant sued to recover dam-
ages for breach of alleged oral contemporaneous agreement that he
should have the exclusive right to sell soft drinks in the building. The
question was, could this oral term of the lease agreement be proved?
The court decided against the tenant since it would have been the
natural thing to have included the promise of exclusive rights."0
There was no opportunity for equitable relief by reformation for
there was no contention that the term had been omitted from the
lease by mistake.
A most interesting case was decided in New York in 1928.71 Here
there was an elaborate written contract for the purchase of a farm-
buyer to pay purchase price in manner described, also to pay her
proportion on mortgages, insurance premiums and water meter
charges, to make a survey of the premises if desired; seller to sell the
farm and the personal property on the farm, which he represents he
owns, to credit amounts paid on contract as part of purchase price,
to assume risk of loss until deed is delivered, and to pay broker's com-
mission; cost of examining title to be a lien on the property. Later
the property was conveyed to the purchaser who now sues the seller
for the specific performance of an alleged oral contemporary under-
taking to remove an ice house which the seller owned on property
across the road and which the purchaser had objected to. Could this
oral stipulation be proved? The court divided five to two, the ma-
"Williston § 638. See also Restatement of Contracts (1932) § 239 (B).
"Gianni v. Russell & Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 Ad. 791 (1924). See also Wagner
v. Marcus, 288 Pa. 579, 136 Atl. 847 (1927); Emmanuel v. Hughes, 295 Pa. 492, 145
Ad. 586 (1929). And see, full note "Parol Evidence Rule as applied to leases"
(1934) 88 A. L. R. 1370, 1380.
71Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N. Y. 377, 16o N. E. 646 (1928). Wigmore quotes from
both opinions at great length. See Wigmore § 2430, p. 99.
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jority holding that the claimed oral term could not be proved. The
prevailing opinion by Andrews, J., and the dissenting opinion by
Lehman, J., are excellent. Both profess to agree completely on the
test to apply and differ only in the application of the test. The oral
term to be admitted must be one that parties would not ordinarily be
expected to embody in the writing. The prevailing opinion found
that, "were such an agreement made it would seem most natural that
the inquirer would find it in the contract." But the dissenting opinion
found that the contract, though it was complete on its face in re-
gard to the subject of the conveyance, did not show that it was in-
tended to embody negotiations or agreements, if any, in regard to a
matter so loosely bound to the conveyance as the removal of an ice
house from land not conveyed. This would seem to be an exceedingly
close case, and it would not be difficult to agree with either position
taken.
Judge Lehman makes this statement which it would be well to
remember: the fact that the parol agreement is established is not a
factor which may be considered in determining the competency or
legal effect of the evidence. No question was raised as to the effect of
the deed on the contract.
In a later case the New York court, applying the same principle,
refused to allow a party to a contract for the sale of real property to
prove an oral undertaking to make repairs and improvements. The
decision here was unanimous. 72 Connecticut 8 and Maryland74 seem
to have adopted the same rule, which it is believed comes closer to
providing a genuine rule of decision based on an understandable
principle than does any other that has been suggested.75
To restate, the procedure is this. Having in mind the subject of
the parties' negotiations and having a writing before us, we ask our-
selves this question: Would parties situated as these were and doing
what these parties were doing, reaching what is at least partial in-
tegration, have naturally and normally included this unexpressed but
asserted term if it had actually been agreed upon, or might they have
left it to parol proof as a part of the whole contract? If normal parties
12Ball v. Grady, 267 N. Y. 470, 196 N. E. 402 (1935).
"Cohn v. Dunn, uii Conn. 342, 149 At. 851, 70 A. L. R. 74o (1930).
'Markoff v. Kreiner, 23 A. (2d) 19 (Md. 1941).
"See full note, Parol Evidence Rule: tests for determining whether entire
agreement is embodied in the writing (1931) 70 A. L. R. 752; 20 Am. Jur., Evi-
dence § 1138.
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would have included it and these parties did not, then it is not a
part of their agreement and the court should refuse to permit it to be
proved. If normal parties might have left it as the subject of separate
statement, then the court should admit it.
It must constantly be borne in mind that what we want is the
intention of the parties and yet we cannot prove it by direct evidence.
It must be inferred from other data.
Other important principles to be borne in mind are: l. Partial
integration, so far as it has gone, can no more be varied than can
complete integration. 2. A written contract may be expressed in more
than one writing. 3. Several contracts, some in writing and some oral,
may be entered into at the same time. 4. The Parol Evidence Rule ap-
plies when the parol term is offered in an action brought on the writ-
ten contract, either as a supplement to the contract, or as a defense to
plaintiff's action, and applies as well when an effort is made to bring
an action on the parol term.76 5. Terms which are read into a con-
tract by the law can no more be varied than can the terms written
by the parties. And the following may be of assistance: The attempt
may be made to introduce evidence, I. To contradict directly. 2. To
contradict inferentially or indirectly. 3. To add to the writing.
When the evidence is offered for the first purpose the court is not
apt to look very closely for a general rule, and the same is true but
to a less degree when the intruder contradicts only indirectly. But in
the third type of case we need an underlying rule, and it is submitted
that the rule stated is the true one, in fact the only possible rule which
can give us a real general principle to which we can at least attempt
to refer our problem for solution. It will be referred to herein as the
modern rule.
It cannot be pretended that this will give a certain and sure solu-
tion of all problems. No matter what rule we pretend to follow, not
all courts would arrive at the same conclusion. To quote what Judge
Cardozo said in another connection: "What is needed, in fact, what
is demanded, is a common sense accommodation of judgment to
kaleidoscopic situations."
VIRGINIA CASES
Proceeding to a consideration of Virginia decisions and setting
aside for the time being cases which involve negotiable instruments,
cases which involve the application of the rule that a deed may be
"'Williston § 631, p. 1814.
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shown to be a mortgage, cases which involve usages, and the rules
which govern when a third person, not a party to the writing becomes
involved in litigation on it, we consider first Brent v. Richards," de-
cided in 1846. Plaintiff had sold a slave to defendant, and had given
a bill of sale which warranted the slave sound and a slave for life.
Later plaintiff sued defendant for breach of an oral undertaking to
permit plaintiff to repurchase the slave. The court admitted the evi-
dence, holding that the oral term "was neither inconsistent with, nor
contradictory of the bill of the sale. At most it is but additional." This
has always been considered a very doubtful case. One might amuse
himself by applying to its solution the many rules of thumb which
have been enunciated by the courts. A decision either way might very
well be reached. But applying the modern rule, would parties situated
as these were, contracting for the sale and purchase of the slave and
providing in a writing for the transfer of title with two warranties,
have naturally and normally included the provision for re-purchase had
that been really agreed on? It would seem that they would, in which
case the parol term should have been excluded. The problem would ob-
viously have been different had the bill of sale served merely to trans-
fer title. But it did much more than that; it contained two con-
tractual obligations, and it would seem to have been natural in that
case to include all of the terms of the entire transaction. In Towner v.
Lucas,78 decided in 1857, we have one of our best known cases. Obligor,
when sued on a bond which he executed with others, endeavored to
show that obligee gave him oral assurance that he would never be
called on to pay the bond, and also promised orally to give him
security against liability. The evidence of course was excluded. It was
clearly a case in which the evidence would directly contradict a term
in the contract. The case is remembered principally for the unusual-
ly fine opinion of Allen, J., which discusses the whole subject very
fully. The same fact situation has been presented in many cases,. some
of which have been referred to already; others will be noted later.
When a deed conveys exactly what the parties intended it to con-
vey, the grantee cannot show that he paid for more land which grantor
orally agreed to convey to him later. All previous negotiations were
merged into the deed. This case clearly establishes the principle that
though it be shown that the term was deliberately left out of the writ-
7743 Va. (2 Gratt.) 539 (1846). See Harvey v. R. F. & P. Ry., 162 Va. 49, 55,
173 S. E. 351 (1934). And see note, Lile, (1899) 5 Va. L. Reg. 317.
"54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705 (1857).
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ing, still the term cannot be established by parol evidence.79 There
are numerous cases involving deeds, and contracts to sell real property
which may have been followed by conveyance. When a land owner
contracts with a railroad company to sell a right of way across his land
and provides in the contract for a certain right of way across the track
but the deed pursuant to the contract fails to mention such reservation,
parol proof of this term will not be admitted. The deed merges the
contract and as the omission was purposely made, there can be no re-
formation.80 Aside from any technical merger or estoppel, this con-
clusion can easily be explained by the modern rule. Parties would
naturally put such a reservation in their deed. If they do not, then it
is assumed there was no such agreement. In a well known case 8' plain-
tiff, who had conveyed land to a railroad company, sued the company
on an oral undertaking to construct and maintain a pass under its
track for use of plaintiff. In a very good opinion the court refused to
permit proof of this alleged undertaking. The real question would
seem to be, would this undertaking have naturally and normally ap-
peared in the deed if it had been a part of the real undertakings of the
parties? While the court reiterated several of the now discredited tests
for determining when integration is complete and parol evidence
should be excluded, the conclusion is sound, for to prove his claim
plaintiff would have to detract from the interest conveyed. Certainly
we should expect to find such interests provided for in the deed. It is
for the same reason that a tenant under a written lease cannot prove
a parol agreement that he should have the right to remove buildings
he might erect on leased premises. 82 And where there was a contract
for sale of land which provided for reservation of possession by the
grantor until a future date, but the deed when executed contained no
reference to this reservation, the grantee was entitled to immediate pos-
session. The court said that such a provision not contained in the
deed conflicted with the plain legal intent of the deed.83 Such a detrac-
tion from the legal interest conveyed would naturally have been in-
cluded in the deed.
But it is not always true that where there is a written contract and
a subsequent deed the latter merges the contract and abrogates it en-
TBroughton v. Coffer, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 185 (1868).
wShenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Dunlop, 86 Va. 346, 1o S. E. 239 (1889).
nTrout v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 107 Va. 576, 59 S. E. 394 (1907). See also Stephen
Putney Co. v. R. F. & P. R. Co., 116 Va. 211, 81 S. E. 93 (1914).
S Tait v. Central Lunatic Asylum, 84 Va. 271, 4 S. E. 697 (1888).
"Woodson v. Smith, 128 Va. 652, 104 S. E. 794 (1920).
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tirely. Whether or not it does so is governed by very clear principles.
8 4
A deed of conveyance has its particular function, to convey the proper-
ty and to set out the convenants. When there has been a prior written
contract, it will in all probability contain many provisions which,
being temporary in character, one would not expect to find in the
subsequent deed. In such a case the contract as to those terms survives
the deed and its terms may be enforced. But if the parties so desire
they may include these subordinate and incidental provisions in their
deed; if they do this they expose themselves to the danger of having
the Parol Evidence Rule exclude all such which were not inserted
in the deed. Here the parties evidently intended the deed to be the
final expression of their entire engagements. Persons who inserted
some of these subordinate provisions would be likely to insert all. It
will be recalled that in the leading New York case, Mitchill v. Lath,
already discussed,8 5 the deed had been delivered, and the question in
issue was whether a term could be added to the written contract. There
is a written contract, later a deed, and then it is attempted to give
effect to an oral undertaking found neither in the contract nor in
the deed. The procedure is interesting. The deed is first examined; if
it contains no provisions except those which one would naturally ex-
pect to find in a deed as a permanent muniment of title and if the
oral term in question has reference to something else, the deed does
not invalidate the term and we proceed to examine the contract to
determine if the oral term can be added to it. Here one may struggle
with the many rules which the courts have applied in determining
whether the parties intended the writing to be complete or only
partial integration of their agreement. Applying what has been here
called the modern rule, we ask ourselves these questions, what is the
nature of transaction the parties were engaged in? What is the writing
they agreed on? Would parties situated as they were and doing what
they were doing, have included the questioned term in the writing
if it had been agreed on? If the answer is yes, the evidence is excluded;
if no, it is admitted.
A Virginia case decided in 1935,86 presented the following interest-
ing situation: Property was conveyed to plaintiff by a deed in the
usual form containing the usual covenants and no more. The deed
8 Williston § 645.
85Note 71, supra.
86Sale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 18o S. E. 173 (1935). See Note (1933) 84 A. L. R.
xoo8 and xo4.
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was made pursuant to a previous written contract for the sale of the
house which contained the usual terms, a description of the property,
the time of possession, the time and amounts of payments, and provided
for a fence to be built around the rear of the house. Later the pur-
chaser sued the seller to recover damages for failure to correct certain
defects in the building and to furnish a policy of title insurance
which the seller by oral agreement had undertaken to do but which
term the parties had intentionally left out of the contract.
Applying the simple principles just stated, it would seem perfectly
clear that these oral undertakings could not be proved. The deed
should not exclude them for evidently the parties did not intend the
deed to do more than convey the property; but in the contract it
would seem too clear for argument that they intended to include all
of the terms of their entire agreement. This was simply an attempt to
add to a written contract. The court, however, decided that the oral
undertakings could be proved, giving as reasons that the parol terms
were collateral, that consideration can be varied, and that there were
two contracts, one oral and one in writing. The first two grounds
for varying writing have already been commented on. It is enough
to say of the third that this leaves nothing of the Parol Evidence Rule,
for the same could be said of any other case in which the offered term
did not contradict something already found in the contract. The case
is in direct conflict with the two New York cases already discussed.
87
The court seems to fall into the grave error of considering this as an
attempt to vary a deed,88 when it was really an attempt to vary a con-
tract; and it is distressing to find the statement that the true considera-
tion agreed upon may always be shown. 9 Evidence is not admissible
to prove that bonds secured by a deed of trust are payable only out of
proceeds of mortgaged property.90 When in a lease of summer resort
property for a period of five years the lessee convenanted to make
certain repairs and improvements but no provisions were made as to
when these repairs were to be completed, evidence to prove that it
was agreed that the repairs were to be made before a certain date
was excluded. The court said the law gave the tenant until the ex-
piration of the lease to fulfill his contract for repairs, and therefore
8'Notes 71, 72, supra.
8See remarks of Browning, J., in Wood v. Southern Shale Brick Corp., 173
Va. 364, 4 S. E. (2d) 360 (1939).
8'Compare Harvey v. R. F. & P. Ry. Co., 162 Va. 49, 58, 173 S. E. 351 (1934).
"0Sangston Cor. Sec. v. Gordon & Riely, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 755 (1872).
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proof of another and different period than the expiration of the lease
would contradict the writing. O'This familiar principle finds frequent
application in cases dealing with negotiable paper.
In a later case,9 2 by written contract defendant agreed to sell to
plaintiff 40o barrels of potatoes, delivery beginning July 1st and ex-
tending to July 2oth, plaintiff to deposit in bank $1.oo per barrel to
guarantee acceptance of potatoes by plaintiff. When the purchaser
sued for non-delivery, the seller offered to prove that by oral agree-
ment, the deposit was to be made as soon as the contract became
effective, and as the deposit was not made the seller was not bound to
make the delivery. The deposit was in fact made on June 28th. The
court very properly said it was essential in the first place to determine
exactly what the contract was as it was expressed in the writing; in
other words, the first problem is that of the proper legal construction
of the written terms. The court then proceeded to hold that what the
parties intended was that the deposit should be made before the de-
livery of the potatoes was to start and this the contract fixed as July i.
The offered parol term would contradict this written provision and
therefore could not be proved. The court very effectively disposed of
the claim that this was merely an attempt to show a condition pre-
cedent to the taking effect of the contract by pointing out the distinc-
tion between a term of the contract and a condition precedent to any
binding obligation upon either of the parties-a distinction which the
dissenting opinion missed entirely. No case could better illustrate
the fact that the process of construction or interpretation on the one
hand and the operation of the Parol Evidence Rule on the other are
often complementary to one another.93 When the construction of the
terms used is fixed upon, the application of the Parol Evidence Rule
may be very plain. In Woodrum v. Bonsack Machine Company, de-
cided in 1891,94 a bill in equity was filed to enjoin Woodrum from
violating a contract not to compete with the company. He had entered
into such a contract in 1888, but in 1889 he and the company entered
into another written agreement whereby the latter, in consideration
of $2o,ooo, agreed that all "matters and things embraced by said con-
tract of July io, 1888 were fully adjusted and settled and the con-
mCalhoun & Cowan v. Wilson, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 639 (1876). See Williston
§ 640.
"Hopkins v. Le Cato, 142 Va. 769, 128 S. E. 55 (1925).
"Note 5, supra.
"Bonsack Machine Co. v. Wbodrum, 88 Va. 512, 18 S. E. 994 (1891).
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tract itself was ended and settled." But in the face of this language
the company contended that it should be permitted to show that
Woodrum's agreement not to compete was not discharged. The court
dismissed the bill. This was really a problem of construction. If the
language used is given its clear meaning, the parol understanding
would be clearly in conflict with it. Whether a full examination of all
the circumstances might not have warranted the court in giving an-
other construction to the language used is not our present problem.
In Scott v. N. & W. Railway Company,95 decided in 1893, Scott
contracted in writing with the company to furnish 170,000 cross-ties
to be placed on the line of the road where they were wanted, but
later he offered to prove a parol term that 20,000 of the ties were to
be hauled by the company to the place where they were wanted. No
clearer case of contradicting the plain terms of the writing can be
imagined, and of course the evidence was excluded; but the court's
reasoning is interesting. It said, if there had been any such agreement
why was it not inserted in this formally prepared and elaborately
written contract. This seems to be getting us into a modem atmos-
phere. It would have been the natural thing to insert this term if it
had been agreed upon. All we need is to shift our attention from
these two parties to normal parties situated as they were, and we have
our modern rule.
In Slaughter v. Smither,96 decided in 1899, we have one of our
best cases. This was a suit in equity to enforce an alleged parol term
of a contract otherwise in writing. The transaction was the sale of a
drug store and business. The writing, which was signed by the buyer
only, was in the opinion of the court "a clear and complete memorial."
It set out the purchase price, strict terms for its payment from the
proceeds of the business, the purchase of additional stock; it provided
that the buyer was to receive a clear bill of sale when the purchase
price of $3500 was paid, the business to remain that of the pur-
chaser until this amount was paid. The parol undertaking on which
the suit was brought was the seller's promise to remove from the city
and discontinue the drug business in the neighborhood. It might be
interesting to pause here and review the cliches which the court
might have utilized. The undertaking is collateral; it can be proved
because consideration can always be varied; the writing is silent on
5Scott v. N. & W. Ry. Co., go Va. 241, 17 S. E. 882 (1893).
96Slaughter v. Smither, 97 Va. 202, 33 S. E. 544 (i8gg). See Tees v. Lee, 291
N. W. 792 (Wis. 1940).
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the subject, therefore the undertaking may be proved. (The court
said of the latter: "On that assumption the rule which excludes parol
evidence as a means of adding to the written contract would be en-
tirely abrogated.") Or it might have said that this was a separate
agreement. The court said none of these things except to discredit
them as rules of decision, but unfortunately it did say that the only
evidence of the completeness of a written contract as a full expression
of the terms of the agreement is the contract itself. Thus, it paid lip
service to a rule which no court follows. The opinion on the whole is
une of our best, the conclusion that the parol term could not be proved
is undoubtedly sound, but it is to be feared that this sound conclusion
was reached first and most of what the court had to say was in justifi-
cation of the conclusion and failed to include the rule which was
applied to reach the conclusion. Applying the modern rule: would
parties negotiating as these parties were, naturally and normally
have included this term in their contract if it had actually been
agreed upon? The answer seems clear, that they would have done so;
then the parol term cannot be proved. This seems so perfectly clear that
it is surprising to find Williston apparently approving the admission
of such evidence.97
Farmers Manufacturing Co. v. Woodworth, decided in 19o9,98 was
an action brought on an oral warranty when there was a written con-
tract. To prove this warranty would not contradict anything in the
writing but it would add to it, and very definitely vary it. The con-
tract which was signed by both parties provided for the manufacture
of an amusement device, called a "revolving parachute," intended to
be erected on the grounds of the The Jamestown Exposition. Defend-
ant contracted to build the steel structure with sixty feet of screw as
per plans submitted, for $5,000; plaintiff was to transport all materials
from defendant's plant to place where the device was to be errected;
the structure was to be ready for delivery by September 15; brake and
air cushion were to be sufficient for purpose intended; metal was to
be used; and black iron work was to be covered with two coats of
paint. Unfortunately, the structure when erected appeared unsafe
and the Exposition officials prohibited its operation. Plaintiff brought
OVWilliston § 642, p. 1844, n. 4, citing many cases.
109 Va. 596, 64 S. E. 986 (19o9). Another case in which the court confused
the Parol Evidence Rule with rules for interpretation and construction is Scott
v. Albemarle Horse Show, 128 Va. 517, 1o4 S. E. 842 (1920). And see Marsteller v.
Warden, 115 Va. 353, 79 S. E. 32 (1913).
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action to recover damages for breach of an oral warranty that the
device would be safe and suitable for its intended use.
The court disposed of the case rather summarily. It said that the
letter which composed the body of the alleged written agreement was
of the most general character and bore internal evidence of the fact
that to be intelligible it must be read in the light of outside matters
in the minds of the parties. The court found the term "steel struc-
ture" a term of general significance which conveys no definite idea of
what was intended, and no material aid was gathered from the in-
spection of the plans referred to. They were mere tracings of the
proposed device. The court thought there were necessarily other
provisions of the contract which did not appear in the writing and
thus permitted the proof of the oral warranty.
The suggestion is ventured that the court confused interpretation
of what was written, with adding to the writing. The reference to "steel
structure" and to "plan submitted" no more made the contract in-
complete than does the reference in a deed to a map or plat, or the
reference in a building contract to outside plans and specifications
make such documents incomplete. Each is merely a reference to an
outside source for the purpose of interpreting what is written, and
the fact that interpretation fails does not afford a ground for adding
terms to the contract.
In a later case in which a contract called for the delivery "of coal
of such quality as is required, as of this date, by the Soldiers' Home
at Johnson City, Tennessee," Judge Chichester in an unusually good
opinion said, "parol evidence was competent to identify these specifi-
cations, but for no other purpose." 99 It would seem very clear that
the fact that it is necessary to go outside of the writing to interpret
terms found in it is no justification whatever for allowing proof of an
oral term in no way connected with the identification of the terms
which need interpretation. The fact that terms need identification or
interpretation does not show that the parties intended the writing
to be only partial integration. It is clear that the modem rule would
have excluded proof of the warranty.
In litigation over an elaborate separation agreement, the husband
was not allowed to prove the wife's oral undertaking not to engage
in certain improper behavior. This needs no comment. Epes, J., said
99Mathieson A. Works v. Va. Banner Coal Corp., 147 Va. 125, 150, 155, 136 S.
E. 673 (1927).
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it is not permissible to insert into a contract a condition or provision
for the termination thereof which is not included in the contract. 100
A contract of employment which the court construed as providing
for employment at will could not be varied by proving an oral agree-
ment for thirty days notice of termination of employment.10 ' The
cases follow the well-established rule that one cannot be permitted to
avoid liability by proving that he was merely an agent. 0 2
Harvey v. R. F. & P. Railway Company, decided in 1934,103 is one
of our strongest cases. Plaintiff was injfired in the course of his em-
ployment by the railway company. In a document in the familiar
form used in such instances, in consideration of $5oo he released his
employer of all liability. Later he sued his employer for breach of
an alleged oral term of his agreement by which he asserted that as
part of the consideration for the release the company had agreed to
pay hospital bills and give him employment for life. The release was
executed only by the plaintiff. Gregory, J., in a very careful opinion
held that the oral term could not be proved. It would have been very
easy to dispose of the case by applying the modern rule that parties
situated as these were would almost certainly have included in the
writing all of the compensation that plaintiff was to receive in ex-
change for his release of the company of liability. While the court did
not do this, it dealt very effectively with several of the reasons usually
given for permitting oral terms to be added, any one of which would
have permitted proof of the plaintiff's claim; but in particular it dealt
most effectively with the contention that the true consideration can
always be shown. It is regrettable that only one year later the court
returned to that heresy. 04 However, four years later,105 the court
again adopted the true view on that subject, in an opinion which put
the matter at rest, for the present at least. The court adhered to this
position in a case decided in 1941,106
Our court has never succumbed to the tempation, which has
overcome the judgment of other courts, to hold that the failure to
'wGloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S. E. 879 (1930).
"Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 164 S. E. 387 (1932).
ImFentress v. Steele & Sons, no Va. 578, 66 S. E. 870 (19o).
2"Harvey v. R. F. & P. Ry. Co., 162 Va. 49, 173 S. E. 351 (1934).
2"Sale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 180 S. E. 173 (1935).
wVWood v. Southern Shale Brick Corp., 173 Va. 364, 4 S. E. (2d) 36o (1939). See
comprehensive note (1936) ioo A. L. R. 1, 17.
"'Burke v. Sweeley, 177 Va. 47, 12 S. E. (2d) 763 (1941). Compare Bruce v.
Slemp, 82 Va. 352 (1886); Summers v. Dame, 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 791 (1879).
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perform an unexpressed term is fraud and that as fraud works an
exception in the Parol Evidence Rule the unexpressed term may be
proved and full effect given to its breach. 07 This reasoning is strik-
ingly circular and in addition it assumes that fraud is an exception
to the rule. It is certainly not. The fraudulent inducement may cause
the contract to be made, but it is never a part of the contract. The
ways along which a ship is launched are not part of the ship.
It is hardly necessary to cite cases to the point that the rule does
not prevent proof of fraud.108 Since our court has recently taken the
position that an innocent misrepresentation will support an action
for damages, 109 it follows that if fraud can be extended to cover a
promise of future performance, the rule that a parol warranty can-
not be added to a written contract" 0 stands in danger of considerable
modification; or, at least, its effectiveness will be greatly modified.
Parties may enter into two or more contracts at the same time,"l '
and they may enter into only one contract which may be found in
more than one document,"12 or it may be part oral and part in writ-
ing. It may be difficult to ascertain what the parties were really in-
tending to do. When the two contracts have to do with different sub-
ject matters, the case may be clear. On the other hand, it is difficult
to distinguish a contract which exists in two parts, both in writing,
or one oral, from a writing which is a complete integration of what
the parties intended but which one 6f the parties is attempting to
alter or add to, in violation of the Parol Evidence Rule.
The intention of the parties expressed in the writing that it is
the sole memorial of their agreement should control, but not even
'10Towner v. Lucas, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705 (z857). The discussion by Allen, J.,
in the opinion in this case is often quoted. Compare Transit Corp. v. Four Wheel
Drive Auto Co., 151 Va. 865, 145 S. E. 331 (1928); Clark v. Miller, 148 Va. 83, 138
S. E. 556 (1927).
InSee Farmers Mfg. Co. v. Woodworth, lo9 Va. 596, 64 S. E. 986 (19o9); Baker
v. Berry Hill Co., 1o9 Va. 776, 65 S. E. 656 (1909); White S. Mach. Co. v. Gilmore
Fur. Co., 128 Va. 63o, io5 S. E. 134 (192o); King v. Commercial Finance Co., 163
Va. 260, 175 S. E. 733 (1934).
1eUnion Trust Corp. v. Fugate, 172 Va. 82, 200 S. E. 624 (19g9); Note (1939) 1
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 98.
nWigmore § 2434; Williston § 643.
1mWilliston § 637; Wigmore § 2430. Harris Magill Co. v. Rogers Co., 143 Va.
815, 129 S. E. 513 (1925).
212Transit Corp. v. Four Wheel Drive Auto. Co., 151 Va. 865, 145 S. E. 331
(1928). Portsmouth Refining Co. v. Oliver Refining Co., lo9 Va. 513, 64 S. E. 56,
132 Am. St. Rep. 924 (1909).
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that was effective in one Virginia case.113 In another case a deed and
a writing were found to be parts of the same contract.114 In another
a contract for the sale of real estate and an oral agreement to do cer-
tain work to complete the dwelling thereon and to install a furnace
in it were held parts of one contra&.115 In an interesting case a note
given for the purchase price of corporate stock and a letter executed at
the same time in which it was provided that the note might be paid
from dividends on the stock116 were held to be parts of one transaction.
An interesting problem in construction arose when it became a reality
that there would be no more dividends. A clear case is that in which
an application containing terms on which a loan was applied for and
the note given for the loan were both parts of the entire agreement. 117
A note for $790, payable on demand, was attached to a writing which
showed that the transaction was the sale of lots of land for $i 19o, $400
of which was paid in cash and the $790 evidenced by the attached note
was to be paid to the seller out of proceeds of the lots as they were sold.
Clearly these documents were part of one entire transaction and both
could be proved."18 Note that the terms of the agreement then be-
came conflicting. This, however, presented a question for interpreta-
tion only. But in a case already referred to there was a deed convey-
ing the premises, a contract of sale which contained what might
ordinarily be expected to be included in such a writing, and an oral
undertaking to make alterations in windows and to furnish a title in-
surance policy, and the court permitted the oral terms to be proved
as part of the complete transaction between the parties."19
We can say with respect to this troublesome question that some
problems are readily solved. The two transactions were clearly separ-
ate and distinct; each must be considered on its own merits. But the
parties may plainly stipulate in one writing that this is their entire
agreement; this should suffice to exclude everything else. Or writings
may be physically attached or they may dearly refer to one another.
But there are other cases which it is impossible to bring within any
rule of decision. We feel that they can be no more than unreasoned
judicial hunches, and what is said about the writings or the writing and
11Note 112, Supra.
"'Note 112, Supra.
"'Luck v. Wood, 144 Va. 355, 132 S. E. 178 (1926).
21OLong v. Mayo, 156 Va. 185, 157 S. E. 767 (1931).
"'Richmond Postal Union v. Booker, 17o Va. 129, 195 S. E. 663 (1938).
"'Nottingham v. Ackiss, 107 Va. 63, 57 S. E. 592 (1907).
rSale v. Figg, 164 Va. 402, 18o S. E. 173 (1935).
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the oral term being parts of one contract is only a make-weight for
a decision already determined upon.
Cases Involving Negotiable Instruments
There are several topics which warrant separate treatment. The
first is the application of the Parol Evidence Rule to negotiable in-
struments or to transactions which include such instruments. Here
Wigmore and Williston have given us some of their best work.120 The
cases may involve varying or modifying the relations of the parties
as they appear on the instrument; or they may involve varying or
modifying the terms of the document or the undertakings therein; or
they may have to do with supplementing the document by showing
additional terms of the entire jural act of which the negotiable in-
strument may be only a part. Further, an act may be in two or more
writings and the note may be only one of them. If all writings are
part of one entire act, then all can be proved and if this produces in-
consistencies, as it may, the problem is one of interpretation. A Vir-
ginia case of that type has just been referred to.
121
Referring again to the modern rule already suggested, when such
a problem is presented we ask ourselves these questions: i. What was
the subject of negotiation between these parties? 2. What is the writ-
ing they have produced? 3. Would normal parties, situated as these
were, if they had agreed on other terms of their act, have normally
and naturally included them in their writing-in this case a negotiable
instrument-or might they have left them to independent expression?
These parties desired to use a negotiable instrument. They knew that
the content of such an instrument must be closely limited or it may
lose its character as a negotiable instrument. Therefore, it is very easy
to conclude that parties situated as these were would very naturally
have left the terms in question out of the negotiable instrument. Then
the court would permit evidence of the questioned term, and it would
be for the jury to say whether the term was actually agreed upon.
But we must also bear in mind that so far as they have reduced their
act to writing, the Parol Evidence Rule protects it, and, in addition,
the terms of what they have written must be interpreted.
The subject is too large to be fully considered here in detail. After
referring to the classical expositions of Wigmore and Williston, we
can do no more than consider some of the Virginia causes.
L'°Wigmore §§2443, 2444, 2445; Williston § 644.
'nNote 118, supra.
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It is important to remember that the application of the rule may
be gravely modified or controlled by the principles of law controlling
in the field in question-in this instance in the field of the law of
negotiable instruments. 122 Thus, one who signs a negotiable instru-
ment without any indication of a representative capacity is held in-
dividually,12 and there is a statutory rule as to one who indicates
more or less clearly that he signs in such a capacity. 24 Joint makers
may show that as between themselves the relation is that of principal
and surety.1 25 It is familiar law that despite his plain promise to the
payee, the maker can show that he signed for accommodation only.
Further examination into this phase of the subject would carry us
too far into negotiable instruments law.
Many cases already discussed on the principle that a condition
precedent to the taking effect of the contract may be shown, involved
negotiable instruments.
126
The cases in which a party attempted to contradict or modify his
pndertaking are many. They fully bear out Williston's terse state-
ment: "A parol agreement that an instrument need not be paid, [127]
or need not be paid in a certain contingency, or may be paid wholly
or partly in merchandise or services,[ 28] or shall not be sued on when
due, or shall be renewed, is also in violation of the parol evidence
rule."129
2'The same is true in any field in which the law requires the entire jural act
to be in writing, in the law of principal and surety and in the field covered by
the Statute of Frauds.
I2 City River Colliery v. Eureka Coal Co., 144 Va. 263, 132 S. E. 37 (1926).
2 4Negotiable Instruments Law § 2o; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5582.
2Elswick v. Combs, 171 Va. 112, 198 S. E. 501 (1938).
lNCrafts v. Broadway Bank, 142 Va. 702, 128 S. E. 364 (1925); Hawse v. First
Nat'l. Bank, 113 Va. 588, 75 S. E. 127 (1912); Robertson v. Va. Nat'l. Bank, 135
Va. 166, 115 S. E. 536 (1923).
1Catt v. Oliver, 98 Va. 58o, 36 S. E. 98o (10oo).
mIndorser not permitted to prove that he was not to be held as an indorser.
Ward v. Bank of Pocahontas, 167 Va. 169, 187 S. E. 491 (1936); Riverview Land
Co. v. Dance, 98 Va. 239, 35 S. E. 720 (0oo); Lynch v. O'Brien, 115 Va. 350, 79
S. E. 389 (1gi3)-
'2Drawer of bill cannot prove that it was agreed that if a certain person
would accept the bill, drawer was to be relieved of liability. Martin v. Lewis, 71
Va. (3o Gratt.) 672 (1878). And see Good v. Dyer, 137 Va. 114, 119 S. E. 277 (1923);
Continental Trust Co. v. Witt, 139 Va. 458, 124 S. E. 265 (1924) (maker of note
given for automobile could not show that note was not to be paid unless buyer
sold the automobile for price equal to amount of note); Crafts v. Broadway Bank,
142 Va. 702, 128 S. E. 364 (1925) (evidence that liability on endorsement to be
satisfied by collections on collateral deposited with the note excluded). Williston
§ 644, p. 1858.
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One of the leading cases is Woodward, Baldwin & Co. v. Foster,
decided in 1868.130 Defendant who had indorsed a bill of exchange
offered to prove a parol agreement between himself and plaintiff-in-
dorsee that defendant was to retain in his hands the amount paid him
for the bill until it was ascertained if the bill was accepted and paid;
if it was not accepted and paid, the bill was to be returned to him and
he would refund plaintiff that amount. This evidence was rejected.
Joynes, J., said in his excellent opinion: "Though the writing con-
sists only of a signature, as in the case of an indorsement in blank, yet
where the law attaches to it a dear, unequivocal and definite import,
the contract imported by it can no more be varied or contradicted by
evidence of a contemporaneous parol agreement than if the whole
contract had been fully written out in words." While it would be
preferable to preserve the distinction between evidence which con-
tradicts directly or inferentially the terms of the instrument and evi-
dence to prove all of the terms which the parties intended- to include
in their complete memorial, the distinction cannot be made in every
case. It is easy to say that the parties did not intend to include a term
which contradicts the undertakings in the negotiable instrument;
the case is not so clear when there is no contradiction, but only ad-
dition. In fact, unless the case is one in which we might expect to
find all of the terms of the agreement in the negotiable instrument
(and these instances are few), the field of supplementation is very
broad, and the evidence if excluded suffers that fate because it vio-
lates our subordinate rule that the Parol Evidence Rule protects
partial integration as far as it has gone. The maker of a note cannot
defeat liability by proving that he was to remain on the land con-
veyed by deed of trust to secure the note and work for the creditor for
a certain period after which the note was to be considered paid. Here
no doubt the oral agreement to work for the creditor for pay could
have been proved, but the evidence that the work was to be accepted
as payment contradicted the promise in the note.181
When a note was given for cattle purchased, an oral undertaking
to repurchase the cattle and thus discharge the note could not avail
against a holder in due course, and the court intimated that it could
not have been proved between the original parties. 3 2 But no doubt
"-Woodward, Baldwin & Co. v. Foster, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 200, 205 (1868). See
also Citizen's Nat'l. Bank v. Walton, 96 Va. 435, 31 S. E. 89o (1898).
tmRector v. Hancock, 127 Va. io, 102 S. E. 663 (1920). Judge Kelly's opinion
is excellent.
'Cox v. Parsons, 165 Va. 575, 183 S. E. 440 (1936).
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the promise to repurchase could have been proved to establish a cause
of action for breach of that promise. One would never expect to find
all of the terms of this entire undertaking in a negotiable note. It is
for this reason that consideration can be gone into fully. 133 We should
not expect to find this in a note. By contrast consider the case in
which there was an elaborate contract reserving title to an automobile
and providing for cash and deferred payment evidenced by notes, and
the buyer offered an oral understanding that the price of the auto-
mobile would be reduced if there was a drop in the market price of
the car. It was not necessary to consider varying the undertakings in
the notes; this was a plain attempt to prove an oral term when the
contract must be assumed to include the entire agreement.8 4 And,
as already noted, when the note and writing are physically attached
to one another or when the note and writing refer one to another,
there is no problem of the Parol Evidence Rule presented, but only a
question of construction.135 There is obviously a radical distinction
between a case in which there is a contract put in writing by the
parties which contains inconsistencies and contradictions and a case
in which it is attempted to introduce parol or even written evidence
which would create such contradictions or inconsistencies. The first
presents only a problem of interpretation, though the parties may
have expressed themselves in such terms as may defy interpretation. 13 6
The latter presents a problem under the Parol Evidence Rule.
Cases Involving Deeds Given as Mortgages
A deed absolute on its face may be shown to be a mortgage. Prob-
ably there is no more familiar axiom in our law. How can this be rec-
onciled with any general rule? Here again Wigmore' 37 and Willis-
ton, 38 giving us the full benefit of their scholarship, have proposed
several courses of reasoning which might account for the rule. All are
interesting. But in the writer's opinion it is safe to say only two
things: i. The chancellor has never permitted the Parol Evidence
113Good v. Dyer, 137 Va. 114, 119 S. E. 277 (1923).
23sJones v. Franklin, x6o Va. 266, 168 S. E. 753 (1933). Compare Godwin v.
Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 17 S. E. (2d) 410 (1941), where there was no written contract.
"Nottingham v. Ackiss, 1o7 Va. 63, 57 S. E. 592 (1907).
2"Knick v. Knick, 75 Va. 12 (88o).
"'Wigmore §§ 2437, 2438.
3Williston § 635; Restatement of Contracts (1932) § 240 (1) (B). See also
Smedley and Blunk, Oral Understandings at Variance with Written Deeds (1939)
34 Iil. L. Rev. 189.
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Rule to stand in the way of proper equitable relief. 2. No more firm
principle of equity can be found than that the chancellor will go be-
hind any front to ferret out the fact that the transaction, no matter
how it may be expressed, is really a security for debt and will ac-
commodate his relief accordingly. We proceed to examine the Vir-
ginia cases, for here the principle has been given fullest application.
The principle applies to transfers of all sorts. An absolute assignment
may be shown to be a mere security for debt, 8 9 and a deed may be
shown to be on trust to pay grantor's debts. 14 0 It seems that though
there is a contract in writing for purchase of land, setting out in de-
tail how the purchase price is to be paid, an oral undertaking to as-
sume a deed of trust on the premises may be proved.' 4' Naturally,
when the contract provides for assumption of a deed of trust, but the
deed when executed does not mention it, the term in the contract
will be given effect.' 42 It is well settled in Virginia that a parol express
trust may be proved. This was decided in 1915,148 after very full con-
sideration and has been steadily adhered to since that time.144 Cases
involving attempts to clog the equity of redemption, 45 as well as
the great group of cases involving constructive trusts, are no doubt
governed by similar principles. It seems not unlikely that ultimately
it may be found necessary to prune this luxurious growth and bring
the entire subject under statutory regulation.
Cases Involving Usages
In the whole subject no more interesting topic is found than that
of usages. By usage is meant habitual or customary practice. It is dis-
tinguished from custom which is "such a usage as has by long and
uniform practice become the law of the matter to which it relates." 46
Usage may present (i) simply a technique for defining a term
found in the contract; (2) it may afford the medium for interpreting
U*Didier v. Patterson, 93 Va. 534, 25 S. E. 661 (1896).
lw°Coffman v. Coffman, 79 Va. 5o4 (1884). Compare Hunter v. Bane, 153 Va.
165, 149 S. E. 467 (1929).
11"Goode v. Bryant, 118 Va. 314, 87 S. E. 588 (1915).
1"2Swain v. Va. Bank, 151 Va. 655, 144 S. E. 645 (1928); Note (1922) 21 A. L.
R. 499; Linbrook Corp. v. Rogers, 158 Va. 181, 163 S. E. 346 (1932).
'"Young v. Holland, 117 Va. 433, 84 S. E. 637 (1915).
1"Daniel v. Viar, 147 Va. 323, 137 S. E. 526 (1927); Hunter v. Bane, x53 Va.
165, 149 S. E. 467 (1929); Jackson v. Greenhow, 155 Va. 758, 156 S. E. 377 (1931).
11"Wyman, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption (19o8) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 459.
'Williston § 649; Harris v. Carson, 34 Va. (7 Leigh) 6532 (1836); Delaplane v.
Crenshaw & Fisher, 56 Va. (15 Gratt.) 457 (1860).
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an undertaking found in the contract; (3) it may serve to add a term
to the contract. Thus, in its first two meanings, only a problem of
interpretation is presented, but the third presents a real problem in
the Parol Evidence Rule when it aids in fixing upon the identity of
the terms of the jural act.
To illustrate, when a contract provides for "Winter Wheat Bran,"
and the purchaser refuses the product tendered because it is not all
bran, as it contains an adulterant, a usage may enable the court to
identify the term used with a commercial product which contains a
certain amount of adulterant.1 47 When a mason claims pay for work
done under a contract which provides pay for cubic feet "measured
in the wall," a usage may cause this term to mean that the corners
shall be counted twice.1 48 When, after performing his contract to ex-
cavate a cellar, the contractor insists that the earth removed belongs
to him, a usage may enable him to make good his claim. All three ap-
plications of usages are demonstrated in these three simple illustra-
tions. But in addition, we should note the rule of thumb that a usage
will not be applied if it is unreasonable. This means probably only
that the usage may not be applied if it contradicts a term found in
the writing to such a decided extent that it cannot reasonably be
inferred that the parties intended that such usage should be a part
of their contract. A leading English case makes the unanswerable
point that if it did not vary the contract there would be no reason
for bringing it into the case.
149
We are not primarily concerned with usage which presents only
a problem in interpretation.1 50 Usage presents one of the problems of
the Parol Evidence Rule when by its operation it adds to a contract;
and the underlying principle seems to be the same as our modem rule,
applicable over the whole subject. The assumption is that "the parties
have not set down on paper the whole of their contract in all of its
terms, but only those which were necessary to be determined in the
particular case by specific agreement, and which of course might vary
infinitely, leaving to implication and tacit understanding all those
general and unvarying incidents which a uniform usage would annex,
'Walker v. Gateway Milling Co., 121 Va. 217, 92 S. E. 826 (1917).
"'Miller v. Wiggins, 227 Pa. 564, 76 At. 711 (191o). Exhaustive note, Trade
Significance of Words (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1228.
2"Brown v. Byrne, 3 El. & Bl. 73 (1854).
-An Oregon court made the following significant observation: "Thus one is
justified in saying that the language of the dictionaries is not the only language
spoken in America." Hurst v. Lake & Co., 141 Ore. 3o6, 16 P. (2d) 627 (1932).
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and according to which they must in reason be understood to con-
tract, unless they expressly exclude them."151
The refusal of the courts to recognize usages which are unreason-
able or which conflict with terms actually found in the contract or
which would countenance- a practice which is contrary to the stand-
ards of fidelity required by the law in the particular relationship are
very readily referred to for support to this principle.
After referring to the work of Wigmore and Williston 52 for
general discussions of this most interesting subject, we may proceed
to note some of the many Virginia cases. While it cannot be pretended
that the courts have followed the division already suggested, it would
probably tend to clearness if they did. And there are cases to be noted
later in which it is critically important to make the distinction be-
tween interpreting and supplementing. The effect of usages in de-
fining terms is illustrated by the case already cited concerning "Winter
Wheat Bran." And in a contract to "excavate" for a foundation, the
word can be interpreted to mean removing earth only and not stone.153
The letters F. 0. B. in a sale contract are interpreted to mean "free
on board." This is so generally recognized that most courts will take
judicial notice of it,1M but this interpretation generally gives rise to
a further problem of interpretation or construction, and here there
may be found a usage which will aid in interpreting not a mere term
but an undertaking. For example, "F. 0. B. sight draft against docu-
ments" means free on board, and such delivery is condition precedent
to right to demand payment. It does not concern the question of
when title passes.155 While the language "F. 0. B. Suffolk" in a trans-
action when property is in Suffolk and buyer in Norfolk means that
Suffolk is the place of delivery, title passes there, and an oral under-
taking to make delivery in Norfolk will be excluded. The case pre-
sents problems of interpretation as well as of the Parol Evidence
Rule.156
An example of cases which have to do with interpreting an under-
MHumfrey v. Dale, 7 E. & B. 266, E. B. & E. 1oo4, 119 Eng. Rep. 1246 (1857);
Williston § 652, 883, n. 5.
u2Wigmore §§ 2440, 2464; Williston c. 23 §§ 648-662; and see excellent Note
(1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 741; Restatement of Contracts (1932) § 245 and following.
2"Rosenberg v. Turner, 124 Va. 769, 98 S. E. 763 (1919) (though the evidence
failed to establish the usage).
nmNotes (1921) 11 A. L. R. 663; (1936) ioo A. L. R. 1470.
ImAspegren & Co. v. Wallerstein P. Co., iii Va. 570, 69 S. E. 957 (1911).
UrLawson v. Hobbs, 120 Va. 69o, 91 S. E. 750 (1917). See 2 Williston, Sales
(2d ed. 1924) §§ 280 A, 28o B.
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taking is found in a case involving a contract for brick work, to be
paid for at a certain price per thousand; such a term will be inter-
preted pursuant to a usage to ascertain the number of bricks laid by
allowing twenty-two bricks per cubic foot, rather than by counting
the bricks actually laid.
1 7
When lumber of a certain grade was purchased to be shipped and
was refused at delivery point because of a usage that such grade of
lumber should not have been put in transit until it was "shipping
dry," it is not entirely clear whether this was a part of the description
of that grade or whether the usage added a term to the contract as to
when such goods should be shipped.6 s But we dearly have cases of
the third type when to an agency contract to sell land, usage adds an
undertaking to pay commissions after a certain rate.1 59 The same
must be said of adding to or limiting an agent's powers by usage. 60
Numerous cases apply the rule that a usage will not be admitted
when its effect would be to contradict what is written. When a seller
of cattle which were to be delivered on October 15 attempted to prove
in excuse of his failure to deliver, a usage that cattle were to be de-
livered between daylight and nine o'clock in the morning, and that
they were so tendered but the buyer was not on hand to receive them,
the court said that he could not give that proof, for such usage would
alter a term in the contract. The purchaser had all day in which to take
delivery.' 6 ' This seems entirely too strict. When a contract by which
an agent is employed to sell land fails to provide for compensation,
the law would undoubtedly supply the term that reasonable compen-
sation was to be paid, but usage was permitted to be proved that a
fixed compensation was to be paid.
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Probably the best known case is North Shore Improvement Com-
pany v. N. Y. P. & N. Ry., decided in 1920.163 A bill of lading pro-
vided that car load freight should be delivered at Colley Avenue sid-
ing, Norfolk, Va. The carrier held the car at Port Norfolk which is
mwichlands v. Hiltebeitel, 92 Va. 91, 22 S. E. 8o6 (1895). To same effect, Rich-
mond v. Barry, sog Va. 274, 63 S. E. io74 (19o9).
=Arkla Lumber Co. v. West Va. T. Co., 146 Va. 641, 132 S. E. 840 (1926).
IwHansbrough v. Neal, 94 Va. 722, 27 S. E. 593 (1897). The fact that the
contract in this case was oral seems to make no difference in principle.
"'Reese v. Bates, 94 Va. 321, 26 S. E. 865 (1897).
naSutherland & Co. v. Gibson, 117 Va. 84o, 86 S. E. lo8 (1915). See also Straus
v. Fahed, 17 Va. 633, 85 S. E. 969 (19z5); Scott v. Chesterman, 117 Va. 584, 85
S. E. 502 (siq5). See comment on this case, Williston, § 652, p. 1882, n. 4.
'mSee note 159, supra.
luNorth Shore Imp. Co. v. N. Y. P. 8- N., 130 Va. 464, lo8 S. E. 11 (1921).
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several miles from Norfolk and across the river, notifying the con-
signee of its arrival and offering to place the car on the indicated sid-
ing when the freight should be paid. The consignee refused to com-
ply. The question was whether the carrier could prove a usage that
this should be considered proper handling of the freight. In a careful
opinion by Burks, J., the court said this could not be done for such a
usage would override an express provision of the bill of lading in
conflict therewith. The court laid down its familiar rule that if the
contract deals with the subject of the usage and conflicts therewith,
the contract prevails. The case seems clear. But would not the con-
clusion have been different if the bill of lading had given the destina-
tion simply as Norfolk, Virginia? A usage cannot be proved which
contradicts the general principle of law that acceptance of part of a
shipment is acceptance of all. 6 4 No doubt the court would be very re-
luctant to permit proof of a usage which would result in hardship
65
or questionable practices-e.g., a usage which would permit an agent
to give less than entire fidelity in his dealings with his principal.166
No attempt has been made to discuss questions which must be solv-
ed by application of principles of conflict of laws,167 or the question
of what is necessary to make a party to a contract chargeable with a
usage.
168
While in the greater number of cases there may be no point in
distinguishing proof of usage to interpret and proof of usage to add
terms to a writing, there are many cases in which the distinction is of
critical importance. The collapse of the sugar market some twenty
years ago brought many such cases before the courts. Refiners' con-
tracts or memoranda of sales are couched in terms which are not in-
telligible to the uninitiated. When buyers refuse to accept delivery
the contract is found to be unintelligible. If its meaning may be made
clear by interpretation, usage in the business may be availed of to as-
sist in the process. But if it is necessary to add terms, then the case
is hopeless in those states which have re-enacted the seventeenth sec-
tion of the Statute of Frauds. There are many such cases. But for the
Statute of Frauds, when the incompleteness of the contract is once
made to appear, the Parol Evidence Rule no doubt would permit
1"Syer & Co. v. Lester, i6 Va. 541, 82 S. E. 122 0914); Williston §§ 651, 655-
""Williston §§ 658, 659.
mFerguson v. Gooch, 94 Va. 1, 26 S. E. 397 (1896); Williston § 659.
11Arkla Lumber Co. v. West Va. T. Co., 146 Va. 641, 132 S. E. 840 (1926).
UsWilliston § 661; Restatement of Contracts (1932) §§ 247, 248; Note (1922)
22 Col. L. Rev. 741.
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oral terms to be added; but not so when integration is required by
law.169
Cases Involving Third Persons
Another rule of thumb to which the courts pay lip service, at least,
is that the Parol Evidence Rule applies only in suits between the
parties; but as a rule of decision this is definitely untrustworthy and
is not followed uniformly, nor could it be. Wigmore says the "state-
ment suffices in most instances to reach correct results, but it is not
sound on principle," and he makes the further discouraging state-
ment that "the precedents are often arbitrary and confused and can-
not be reconciled by any general distinctions."' 70 One who examines
the cases will readily agree. Williston in his careful discussion of the
subject says, "But where the issue in dispute even between third par-
ties, is what are the obligations of A and B to one another, and those
obligations are stated in a written contract, the parol evidence rule is
applicable," and "There can be no doubt that if a third person claims
in the right of a party to a written contract, he is subject to the parol
evidence rule." But he also finds cases which are hard to reconcile
with any principle.
171
Very little can be said with assurance except that the rule of
thumb is undependable; that the subject is in a state of great judicial
confusion; and that it is unsafe to venture a prediction of the result
in any except the plainest cases, fortified by local precedent.
Virginia cases are not distinctive in any way. From a very briefly
reported case it may be gathered that a Lumber Company had rights
in timber land which would yield to a subsequent purchase for value
and without notice. The Company, suing to enjoin infringement of
its rights by defendant who claimed under a subsequeit contract, was
permitted to prove by oral testimony that the writing was not what
it purported to be, but was a mere license which had been revoked.
1'Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., 12 (2d) 885 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1926). The court said: "We are not writing into the contract something
that is not in it, but we are finding the meaning of the terms used." Franklin
Sugar Refining Co. v. Lipowicz, 247 N. Y. 465, 16o N. E. 916 (1928). The buyer in
this case took a loss of 17.30 cents per pound. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v.
Howell, 274 Pa. 19 o , 118 Ad. 1o9 (1922). Here the court refused to permit a writ-
ten price list not referred to in the memorandum to be made a part thereof. Ex-
haustive note, Trade Custom or Usage to explain or supply essential terms in a
writing required by Statute of Frauds (1924) 29 A. L. R. 1218.
" nWigmore § 2446; also i Greenleaf on Evidence (i6th ed.) §§ 279, 3o5 h.
1n7Villiston § 647. See also Strahorn, The Unity of the Parol Evidence Rule
(1929) 14 Minn. L. Rev. 20, 41.
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Of course, this could not have been shown between defendant and his
contracting party." 2 This conclusion seems orthodox.
In a prosecution for selling without license, when the defense
was that the transaction was entirely interstate, it was very properly
held that the prosecution could go behind the written agreement be-
tween defendant and his customer and show that the transaction was
really intrastate." 3 No other conclusion would have been possible.
Surely conspirators who put what they pretend to be their plan in
writing so that it appeared entirely innocent could not invoke the
rule to prevent the government from showing what the real plan was.
It is not necessary to refer to the rule in such a case. In a leading case
the assignee of a tenant was not permitted to vary the terms of the
lease between his assignor and his landlord."
4
This discussion is closed with the statement of a principle from
which there seems to be no dissent: A "subsequent agreement alter-
ing, waiving, discharging, or otherwise novating a prior transaction
is not excluded by reason of the prior transaction having been re-
duced to writing.""2 Virginia cases are fully in accord."76
'"Bruce v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 87 Va. 381, 13 S. E. 153 (189).
'"Roselle v. Com., 110 Va. 235, 65 S. E. 526 (19o9).
""Calhoun & Cowen v. Wilson, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 639 (1876).
"1'Wigmore § 2441.
171J. P. Houck Tanning Co. v. Clinedinst, i18 Va. 131, 86 S. E. 851 (1915);
Warren v. Goodrich, 133 Va. 366, 112 S. E. 687 (1922).
